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Much of the debate on the impact of unemployment compensation on labour markets reveals an 
ignorance of the actual workings of unemployment benefit schemes. This paper uses 
unpublished data derived from the administration of unemployment insurance (UI) in Britain to 
show why it is that less than a quarter of the British unemployed stock actually receive UI.
* Department of Economics, European University Institute and QMW, University of London. 
This research was funded by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation. I am grateful to the 
Department of Social Security for supplying unpublished data (the Department is not responsible 
for my interpretation of these) and to Clare Evans for excellent research assistance. Helpful 
comments were made by the Department’s Analytical Services Division and by Tony Atkinson 
and Adrian Sinfield. I remain responsible for the views and any errors which the paper 
































































































































































































In November 1989, only 1 in 5 unemployed persons in Britain were receiving 
National Insurance Unemployment Benefit: 18% of unemployed men and 25% of women. 
These figures refer to the unemployed who were claiming benefits; the low coverage of 
insurance benefit in the data concerned is not explained by the failure to apply for payment. 
The National Insurance scheme, the traditional corner-stone of the British system of financial 
support during unemployment, does not provide cover for the majority of the unemployed 
claiming benefits at any one time.
The low coverage of insurance benefit has led to a corresponding dependence on 
means-tested assistance. In November 1989, 2 out of every 3 men claiming unemployment 
benefits, and 1 in 2 women, received only means-tested Income Support (the data on which 
these calculations are based are described in the Appendix). It is means-tested benefit, 
rather than insurance benefit, which is the principal source of income from the state for 
those currently unemployed in Britain today. This has in part resulted from long-term 
unemployment leading to exhaustion of entitlement to National Insurance benefit, but also 
from government policy which has progressively restricted access by the unemployed to 
payments from the state insurance system (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1989).
The low level of coverage of National Insurance (NI) benefit amongst the unemployed 
in Britain is a cause for concern; whether the unemployed receive insurance or means-tested 
benefit should not be a matter of indifference. The dominance of means-tested benefit has 
serious implications for both the generosity of financial support during unemployment and 
the operation of the labour market. As far as the former is concerned, the level of income 
received may differ under the two types of benefit. The fact that some unemployed people 
receive Income Support in addition to National Insurance benefit (1 in 3 of men with 
insurance benefit in November 1989 and 1 in 10 of women) shows that the latter does not 
always provide a higher payment. But for those claimants with other sources of income of 
their own, or within the immediate family, the level of support from insurance benefit may 
well be superior.1 This will typically be the case for a married claimant whose spouse is at 
work, the income of the spouse being taken into consideration in the calculation of Income 
Support entitlement.
The reduction of benefit through the family means-test in turn has consequences for 
incentives to work for the spouse. This is on account of the high implicit marginal rate of 
tax applied to his or her income via the means-test, the rate being 100% on earned income
‘See Atkinson and Micklewright (1985) Table 7.5 for evidence based on a sample of 




























































































in excess of a small disregard (£10 per week in 1988/89). Evidence suggests that the 
negative effect on incentives for spouses of the unemployed of this aspect of means-tested 
benefit may be considerable (Dilnot and Kell, 1987, Garcia, 1989, Kell and Wright, 1990). 
Insurance benefit does not have the same implications for labour supply.2 In addition, its 
existence may provide an incentive to enter the labour force and to work in the formal 
rather than the informal economy (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1990).
This paper investigates the different reasons why unemployed persons do not receive 
unemployment insurance benefit in Britain. Why is it that less than a quarter of the 
unemployed claiming benefits at any one time receive payments from the National Insurance 
scheme? How important really is exhaustion of entitlement? Do many of the unemployed 
have too poor a contribution record to receive National Insurance benefit? How has the 
position changed since the 1970s? How did the unemployment insurance system cope with 
the record levels of unemployment in the mid-1980s? Is the low level of coverage today 
the result of a decline in traditional full-time employment and the rise in self-employment, 
part-time and temporary employment? These sorts of questions are relevant not only to 
Britain; a low proportion of the unemployed receiving unemployment insurance can be seen 
in various OECD countries e.g. France, Germany and the US (Micklewright, 1990).
Section I deals with the preliminaries. It documents the decline in coverage of 
National Insurance unemployment benefit, outlines the essential features of the British 
system of state insurance against unemployment, discusses different measures of coverage, 
and describes the data used in the ensuing analysis. These data, collected by the 
Department of Social Security in the form of twice-yearly 5% samples of the claimant 
unemployed stock, record the official reason for non-receipt for those with no insurance 
benefit in payment. They form the basis for a limited number of tabulations in the annual 
government publication Social Security Statistics, but none of these concern the reasons for 
non-receipt of insurance benefit. Indeed, the lack of published information on the outcomes 
of the National Insurance unemployment benefit scheme is one of principal reasons for this 
paper. The analysis presented in the paper uses data drawn from the ten years 1979-1988. 
Section II considers the most important reasons why the unemployed claiming benefits do 
not receive insurance benefit, showing how their impact changes with duration of 
unemployment and the age of the claimant. Section HI concludes.
2A dependant’s addition to NI benefit is payable if the spouse’s weekly earned income 
is less than the amount of the addition (which was £20.20 in 1988/89). If  it exceeds this 





























































































I. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN BRITAIN
i) The Decline of UI
The emergence of the current position, with insurance benefit received by a minority 
of the unemployed stock and means-tested benefit by the majority, is illustrated in Figure 1. 
This shows, for men, the proportion of stock in each year from 1960 in receipt of National 
Insurance benefit (with or without means-tested supplementation) and the proportion 
receiving means-tested benefit only. The data refer to the unemployed claiming benefits and 
the figures for each year are averages of 100% quarterly counts (further details are given in 
the Appendix). The principal means-tested benefit received by the unemployed in Britain 
has had various names over the period (National Assistance from 1948-66, Supplementary 
Benefit from 1966-88, and Income Support from 1988), and in view of this it is labelled in 
Figure 1 as "Unemployment Assistance" (UA), this name being used throughout the paper. 
The term "Unemployment Insurance" (UI) is used for National Insurance unemployment 
benefit.
Throughout the 1960s, over a half of male benefit claimants in the unemployed stock 
received unemployment insurance (UI) with about a quarter receiving just assistance benefit 
(UA). Since 1971, however, the coverage of UI has exceeded 50% for men in just one 
year, 1981 (it should be noted that the figure for this year is based on only one quarter), 
and with the exception of 1980, 1981 and 1985, coverage has fallen in every year from 
1975, dropping beneath a quarter in 1988 to a fifth in 1989.
The position for women is shown in Figure 2. The top half of the diagram shows 
that this has been little different, coverage of UI being somewhat lower than for men in the 
1970s and notably higher in the 1980s. A generally declining coverage of insurance benefit 
through the two decades is again apparent. As with the men, the proportion with only UA 
has exceeded the proportion with UI since 1982, there being the similar marked divergence 
between the two series in recent years. The bottom half of the diagram shows, however, 
that the picture for married and single women has not been the same. The proportion of 
married unemployed women receiving UI in 1989, some 45%, is much higher than that for 
single women or for men, although the decline of some 20 per cent points since 1981 has 
been similar. Only 17% of single unemployed women received UI in November 1989, 
compared to nearly 50% in the early 1970s when coverage was comparable to that for 
married women. The pattern for single women over the period is similar to that for men, 
while the coverage of married unemployed women actually rose during the 1970s.
Why is the coverage of insurance benefit so low? How can the patterns in Figures 1 
and 2 be explained? To those familiar with the benefit system in Britain, a number of 
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long-term unemployment; in general, UI is not payable in Britain if unemployment lasts 
more than a year. The number of long-term unemployed has certainly been an important 
reason for the low coverage by UI of the unemployed stock. But we cannot look for an 
explanation of coverage only in terms of long-term unemployment; the proportion of the 
unemployed without UI at any one time greatly exceeds the proportion in long-term 
unemployment. For example, in November 1989, 37% of the unemployed claiming benefit 
had been unemployed for over a year but 80% of claimants had no UI. There must be 
important reasons, other than long-term unemployment, why those claiming payment do not 
receive insurance benefit (and we cannot in any case assume that all the long-term 
unemployed previously received UI).
The level of UI coverage has therefore to be explained. The same is true of changes 
in UI coverage. The proportion of long-term unemployed, although a very important
determinant of aggregate receipt, does not fully explain changes in UI coverage over time. 
For example, the proportions of both male and female unemployed in spells of over a year 
peaked in 1987 but UI coverage for both sexes continued to fall during 1988-89.
The importance of reasons other than exhaustion in any explanation of the coverage of 
UI is underlined by Figure 3. This refers to men and restricts attention to those 
unemployed for less than a year; the long-term unemployed are therefore excluded. The 
proportion of men in the unemployed stock receiving UI in spells of less than a year has 
been below one half since 1983. There appears to have been a growing problem of 
non-receipt for those unemployed less than 12 months,
ii) The British UI System
Only a brief outline of the rules regarding receipt of unemployment insurance in 
Britain is given here. For a detailed account of the 1970s unemployment benefit system, 
see Atkinson and Micklewright (1985, chapter 2), and Atkinson and Micklewright (1989) for 
a description of the changes during the 1980s. The account below glosses over many of 
these details and is intended only to convey the essentials (some details will emerge where 
relevant in Section 2).
As in other countries, receipt of unemployment insurance in Britain is governed by 
three principal rales concerning (i) the definition of a satisfactory contribution record, (ii) 
the manner of entering unemployment and conduct while unemployed, and (iii) the duration 
of entitlement.
Contribution Record
Two conditions need to be satisfied and there were significant changes to both in 
October 1988. Prior to this date, the rules were broadly speaking that, first, a claimant had 
to have paid contributions on a stipulated value of earnings in any previous tax-year 

























































































































Fig. 3: MEN UNEMPLOYED < 1 YEAR WITH Ul









































































































immediately preceding the year in which the claim for UI was made. But for the purpose 
of the second condition, these earnings could be "credited" in circumstances described 
below. To have qualified for UI, a person entering unemployment in 1988 would have 
needed earnings of at least £1,950 during 1986/87 (assuming no crediting) and more than 
this if earnings had fluctuated around the lower threshold for National Insurance 
contributions.3
Crediting occurs during any week when a person is claiming unemployment benefits 
(UI or UA) or sickness/invalidity benefits and is a crucial feature of the National Insurance 
scheme. In the case of unemployment, the effect of crediting is to emeliorate the impact 
that a week of unemployment would otherwise have on a person’s contribution record. The 
effect of crediting is to impute annual earnings, towards the necessary total, at the level of 
the lower threshold for contributions. The second contribution condition can be satisfied 
even if a person has spent the entire relevant contribution year in registered unemployment. 
In this way, in the pre-1988 system, past unemployment did not have a deleterious impact 
on a persons’s contribution record (although it could affect the duration of benefit, as 
described below).
Since October 1988, this has no longer been the case. Both conditions have been 
tightened substantially. Notably, the first condition, concerning the level of earnings on 
which a claimant must have paid contributions, now refers to the immediately preceding tax 
year (rather than any year as previously). A significant amount of unemployment during 
one tax-year year now substantially reduces the probability of receipt of UI in a future 
calendar year and an entire tax-year spent unemployed rules out future receipt altogether in 
a future year. And the second contribution condition now requires the relevant level of 
paid or credited earnings in each of the two preceding tax-years.
It should be noted that some forms of employment do not result in contributions 
which lead to qualification for UI. Part-time work resulting in earnings beneath the 
National Insurance threshold is one example. The contributions made by the self-employed 
also fall into this category; self-employment does not result in UI cover. The same applies 
to those employed married women paying a "reduced rate" contribution. Prior to May 1977 
married women had a right to choose whether to pay a lower level of National Insurance 
contributions which, amongst other things, brought no entitlement to UI. Those that made 
that choice continued to have the right to carry on paying contibutions at the reduced rate
’National Insurance contributions are eamings-related in Britain, but are not payable if 
weekly earnings fall below a certain level, £39 during 1986/87. For each week of 
employment in which earnings dipped below £39, in 1986/87, no contributions would be 
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after 1977, again with no UI cover.4
The prevalence of reduced rate contributing amongst married women is given in 
Figure 4, which shows the proportion of married women employed at any time in the year, 
from whom only reduced rate contributions were collected. In the mid-1970s, two-thirds of 
employed married women were in this category. Since then the figure has declined 
substantially but in 1986/87 it was still the case that more than a fifth chose to contribute 
at a rate providing no insurance cover during unemployment (all of whom were of course 
married before 1977). On the face of it, the fall in the numbers paying reduced rate 
contributions may be an important explanation of why the coverage of UI amongst married 
unemployed women rose in the late 1970s. However, the continued fall in reduced rate 
contributing in the 1980s has been accompanied by falls in UI coverage for married women, 
rather than the expected rise.
Duration o f Entitlement
Unemployment insurance in Britain is payable for a maximum of 52 weeks. This 
does not vary with the contribution record; in contrast to the situation in many OECD 
countries, where length of entitlement may vary with earnings or weeks of employment in 
the base period, the 52 weeks of entitlement in Britain apply to all persons who qualify for 
UI. It is not subject to extension in areas of high unemployment, which again distinguishes 
the system from that operating in some countries. However, entitlement to UI can be 
exhausted before a spell of unemployment has lasted a year, and in this way not all 
individuals face a 52 week benefit period when starting each spell of unemployment. This 
is on account of the provisions linking together separate spells of unemployment separated 
by only short periods of time. If two spells of unemployment are separated by less than 8 
weeks (13 weeks prior to September 1980), then they are treated as one for the purposes of 
the duration of UI entitlement, a feature of the unemployment benefit system sometimes 
known as the "linked-spells" rule. In this way, UI entitlement can be exhausted before a 
spell of unemployment is a year long. Once UI entitlement has been exhausted, a further 
claim will not be allowed until the individual has worked for 13 weeks.
This possibility of "early" exhaustion is not widely recognised, not least among those 
who comment adversely on the longer duration of UI in Britain compared to the United 
States. It should be noted that the linked-spells rule applies to all separations, regardless of 
the reason for the start of each spell of unemployment; it applies equally in the case of 
layoff (permanent or temporary) and voluntary quitting, although the latter could lead to 
additional penalties described below.
“The option may be cancelled at any time by the worker, and this occurs automatically 




























































































A consequence of the linked spells rale is that it is not only long-term unemployment 
which may result in exhaustion of UI entitlement. "Early" exhaustion will be a result of 
recurrent unemployment, a prominent feature of unemployment in Britain. As is well 
known, the distribution of unemployment in Britain (as in most countries) is unequal, a 
minority of the workforce accounting for most of the unemployment.5 To the extent that 
higher rates of unemployment are associated with greater recurrence, one would expect to 
see more exhaustion of benefit independent of the proportion of the unemployed who are 
long-term.
Entry into Unemployment and Behaviour when Unemployed
In common with other countries, Britain has a UI system which can impose 
substantial penalties on "voluntary" unemployment although this is often overlooked by those 
who view the system as offering the possibility of a "benefit holiday”. Benefit may be 
refused if a person has entered unemployment voluntarily "without just cause" or as a result 
of industrial misconduct. It is conditional on being available for work and may be 
withdrawn if job offers are refused. Availability, which requires a regular declaration and 
proof of search activity if requested, is a condition for benefit. Voluntary quitting, 
misconduct and job refusal can lead to suspension of benefit. The maximum 
disqualification period was set at 6 weeks in 1948, but this was extended to 13 weeks in 
1986 and then to 26 weeks in 1988. Benefit entitlement is suspended rather than shortened 
(although provisions do exist in the relevant legislation for the latter). A person disqualified 
from UI is not credited with National Insurance contributions during the period of 
disqualification and in this way the lengthening of the maximum disqualification period to 6 
months has a double impact, reducing the probability of satisfying the contribution 
conditions for UI (themselves now more stringent) in a later unemployment spell. Note that 
an individual may still be eligible for UA (albeit at a reduced rate) if disqualified from UI, 
and for these people there is clearly an incentive to carry on claiming benefits. 
iiilCoverage of UI and Data on UI Receipt
To this point, the figures quoted on "coverage" of UI have referred to one particular 
measure: the proportion of the currently unemployed who are receiving UI payments. This 
figure, which may be called measure A, is an important statistic in the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of a UI scheme. However, it is not the only measure of coverage. A second, 
measure B, is the proportion of all spells of unemployment in which UI is received. A 
third, measure C, would be the proportion of all weeks of unemployment during which UI 
is paid.
5For example, among a sample of men entering unemployment in 1978, half had spent 




























































































These three measures should be seen as complementary and they may each give a 
rather different impression of the effectiveness of a UI scheme. Measure A refers to the 
coverage of the unemployed stock - all those persons unemployed at any one time - and the 
"length-bias" of this measure of unemployment needs to be taken into account. The stock 
is composed of incompleted spells of unemployment and the number of these which are 
observed as over 12 months long - and hence not covered by UI - is out of proportion to 
the number of completed spells of over a year in the population of all unemployment spells. 
For example, only 13% of people who started to claim unemployment benefits in the year 
from July 1987 had not left unemployment within 12 months (Department of Social 
Security, 1989, Table 9) whereas over 40% of the stock of unemployed during this period 
represented long-term unemployment i.e. spells of longer than a year. The stock provides a 
non-random sample of spells, long spells being over-sampled.
This is one reason for looking at measure B which, together with measure C, relates 
to the population of all spells of unemployment. Figures for coverage on measure B are 
not regularly published but the indications are that coverage of UI on this definition is 
substantially higher than on measure A, although still far less than 100%: the 1990 Public 
Expenditure White Paper referring to a figure of "about half' for the proportion of all spells 
in which UI is paid (Department of Social Security, 1990, p. 12). However, the differing 
importance of long-term unemployment for measures A and B is not the only reason for 
any differences in coverage of UI which they show. Measure B refers to the receipt of UI 
at any time during a spell of unemployment. Unlike measure A, it will not be affected by 
administrative delays in determining entitlement at the start of the spell or by early 
exhaustion. Section It will show that these are prominent features of the unemployment 
benefit system in Britain. These examples illustrate the complementarity between the 
different measures. Measure C adds another dimension. In effect, this measure weights 
each spell according to its contribution to total weeks of unemployment. No information on 
coverage under measure C exists.
The analysis of Section II focuses on those persons recorded as not receiving UI in 
the type of data needed to calculate coverage measure A i.e. data on the unemployed stock. 
These data are twice-yearly 5% samples (drawn in May and November) of the unemployed 
registered with the Department of Social Security (DSS) as claiming benefits (more details 
are given in the Appendix). In most instances, the analyses made here have combined the 
two counts from each year. The data record the type of benefit in receipt (UI, UA, both 
UI and UA, or neither), the reason for non-receipt if no UI was in payment, and each 
individual’s sex, marital status, age, and duration of unemployment.
The fact that the data refer to the unemployed stock and not to the flow needs to be 




























































































data but also for the conclusions which may be reached about the importance of different 
causes of non-receipt. The present paper does not aim to give a definitive analysis of the 
coverage of the British UI system and it is clear that any such analysis should use both 
stock and flow data. A second aspect of the data which should be stressed is that they are 
drawn by the DSS from administrative registers and refer to persons claiming unemployment 
benefits. They are not samples of the pool of those without work and searching for a job.4 
The data used here cannot reveal the proportion of active searchers who receive UI or the 
reasons why those searching do not receive benefit.
On the one hand, there are those in the DSS samples who claim benefits but who are 
not looking for work. On the other, there are those who are looking for a job but who do 
not claim benefits, since they know that they will not be entitled, or for some other reason. 
The distinction between an administrative definition of unemployment based on claiming 
benefits and a behavioural one based on search activity is an important one. The 1982 ILO 
Guidelines, now used by the OECD, relate to the latter, but the official measure of 
unemployment in Britain is based on the former. The annual Labour Force Survey reveals 
that the total number of unemployed in Britain on the two definitions have in fact been 
quite similar in recent years. However, substantial numbers of persons are unemployed on 
one definition but not on the other. In Spring 1988, this applied to nearly a third of the 
unemployed on either definition despite the claimant count being less than 2% bigger than 
the ILO/OECD total (Department of Employment, 1989).
Although the total number of unemployed is very similar on the two definitions, there 
are big differences between the situation for men and women. In 1988, the male claimant 
count was 20% greater than the number of men unemployed on the ILO/OECD definition 
whereas for women it was 25% less. Fewer than a fifth of the ILO/OECD total of 
unemployed males were not claimants but over half of women were in this position. It is 
easy to see why the incentive to claim is low for married women. A married women 
returning to work after several years out of the labour force would be unlikely to qualify 
for UI on account of the contribution conditions. Even if unemployment followed several 
years of work, she would not receive UI if she joined the labour force before 1977 and 
opted for a reduced contribution rate (explained above). For those married women without 
UI there remains the possibility of means-tested UA, but the chances of qualifying for UA 
are low if her husband has a job or is himself receiving unemployment benefits.
Suppose for the moment that the ILO/OECD figures accurately represent the total of 
the unemployed genuinely wanting a job, the group to whom the unemployment benefit 6
6For this reason, care should be taken in comparing the results with those from other 
studies of UI coverage, such as that of Blank and Card (1989) in the US, where it is the 




























































































system is intended to give financial support.7 What do the numbers just described tell us 
about the likely UI coverage of this group, which for convenience we can label "searchers"?
By way of example, consider three possible assumptions which could be made about 
the search activity of UI recipients.





In May 1988, there were 398,420 men recorded by the DSS as currently receiving UI, a 
figure that represents 29% of the number of unemployed searchers in Spring 1988 on the 
ILO definition (unpublished DSS data and Department of Employment, 1989, Table 1). For 
women, the figure is 24%. These compare with figures of 24% for men and 32% of 
women for the UI coverage of claimants. UI coverage of searchers, on the assumption that 
UI recipients represent a sub-set of these, is 5 points higher for men and 8 points lower for 
women.
Alternatively, we could assume that all non-searching claimants receive UI. This 
represents maximum Type II error; every person who should not be covered, does receive 
UI. Searcher UI coverage is given by:
UI recipients minus non-searching claimants 
searchers
(2)
However, given the Spring 1988 Labour Force Survey data, this second assumption makes 
no sense. For both sexes, the number of non-searching claimants at this time exceeded the 
number of UI recipients and the numerator in (2) would therefore be negative. There must 
be some non-searchers who do not receive UI, but the greater the number who are assumed 
to be in receipt, so UI coverage among searchers is driven down to zero.
Finally, if the probabilities of receipt of UI and of search are independent, the 
probability of UI conditional on search equals the unconditional probability of UI. This in 
turn equals the probability of UI conditional on a claim, multiplied by the probability of a
’This supposition is open to objection since, amongst other categories, discouraged 
workers are excluded under the ILO/OECD definition. Note also that the discussion in the 
text ignores any variation in the amount of search effort of those defined as searching in 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Wadsworth (1989) concludes from LFS data that those 




























































































claim. UI coverage of searchers is now given by:
UI recipients claiming searchers
X (3)
claimants searchers
The independence assumption yields estimates of UI coverage among searchers in Spring 
1988 of 20% for men and 15% for women. If we restricted attention to coverage of those 
searchers who claim (for which there seems little justification) then independence implies 
that coverage is equal to that of all claimants, which is measured by the DSS data.
This exercise shows that the UI coverage of searchers could be markedly different 
from the UI coverage of claimants. However, it seems unlikely that figures for claimant 
coverage based on the DSS data provide an underestimate of searcher coverage. If 
anything, the opposite may be the case and for women this must be true since the 
ILO/OECD total of female searchers exceeds that of claimants. As far as men are 
concerned, if UI recipients are more likely to search than non-recipients, UI coverage of 
searchers (on the ILO/OECD definition) could exceed that of claimants, although at the 
neutral position of independence the reverse will be true. Moreover, the ILO/OECD 
definition of unemployment excludes some claimants whom one could arguably wish to see 
receiving UI, such as discouraged workers and those waiting to take up a job. For this 
reason, our estimates of the range of possible figures for UI coverage of "searchers" should 




























































































II. REASONS FOR THE NON-RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Figure 5 shows separately for male and female unemployed claimants the relative 
importance of five different reasons for the non-reciept of UI in 1988 (Table A1 in the 
Appendix provides details in each year 1979-88 and Table A2 provides a split between 
married and single women).
It is striking is that although exhaustion of entitlement is the most important cause of 
non-receipt for men, it accounts for little more than half of cases where UI is not in 
payment. And less than a third of women without UI fall into this category. For women, 
a deficient contribution record, and not exhaustion, is the single most important explanation 
for the lack of benefit and this accounts for nearly 30% of non-receipt for men as well. 
Disqualification, on the other hand, affects fewer than 1 in 100 of non-recipients of both 
sexes in the unemployed stock.
Much more important than disqualification is the delay in determining whether a 
claimant is entitled, a possibility that is often overlooked by those commenting on the 
impact of UI on individuals’ decisions. This explains the lack of UI for 1 in 10 men and 
1 in 6 women. Many of the persons in this category may go on to receive UI but for 
some the eventual verdict on the claim will be negative. Finally, there is the residual 
category "Other Reasons". These include the official waiting period of 3 days before UI 
payments start in the event of a successful claim, the receipt of wages in lieu of notice for 
those unemployed on layoff, and the removal of entitlement in the case of large 
occupational pensions.
A number of obvious questions arise. Are those with exhausted entitlement all 
long-term unemployed? Is the problem of a deficient contribution record restricted to the 
young? Are delays in establishing entitlement a problem only in spells of unemployment 
which have recently begun? The rest of paper looks in turn at the three principal causes of 
non-receipt recorded in stock data: undetermined claim, insufficient contributions and 
exhaustion. Before doing so, however, a further word on disqualification is needed.
The reader may be left with the impression from these data on the unemployed stock 
that disqualification is a very rare event in the administration of UI in Britain. Not only 
were a very small number of claimants in 1988 recorded as disqualified from UI for 
voluntary quitting or industrial misconduct - less than 1% - but this was true throughout the 
period 1979-88 and applies to both sexes (see Table Al); for example, only 2% of either 
sex were in this situation in 1979.® However, it is the case that in 1988, about 9% of all 8
8This can also be seen in data for men from the 1970s, the proportion affected in 1972 






































































































































































































































































































































































































new claims to UI were disqualified for reasons of quitting or misconduct.9 This figure 
relates to the population of all unemployment spells rather than the non-random sample 
provided by the unemployed stock. It gives a rather different picture and reminds us that 
the ideal analysis would look at both stock and flow data, 
i) An Undetermined Claim: not only the early days
Before the Department of Social Security can decide whether a claimant can receive 
UI, his or her contribution record must be checked and the reason and circumstances of 
entering unemployment has to be verified.10 This takes time and explains why a number of 
claimants are recorded in the DSS data as not currently receiving UI due to their claim 
being "not yet determined". Those who go on to receive UI will have the payments 
backdated to the time of the initial claim, and a claim for UA can be made while 
entitlement to UI is being adjudicated (the amount of any UA paid while a UI claim is 
determined is subtracted from any backdated lump-sum UI which may be eventually paid).
It might be argued that delays in payment of UI are not of real concern as far as 
living standards of the unemployed are concerned and are also of no economic significance 
as regards behaviour. However, the access of the unemployed to credit may be limited and 
the delay in assessing a claim represents a source of uncertainty. It is not the case that UA 
is invariably paid during the delay; in 1988, only 40% of men waiting for their UI claims 
to be determined, and 30% of women, were recorded in the DSS data as receiving UA.
In 1988, 8% of all unemployed men and 11% of women were recorded as not in 
receipt of UI due to delays in determining their claim. For both sexes, a half of people in 
this position had been claiming benefit for more than 3 weeks. Figure 6 shows the 
proportion of unemployed in each duration range who were affected in 1988. Over a fifth 
of men and a quarter of women in the 4-6 week range were still awaiting adjudication of 
their claims and even in the 10-13 week range, over 1 in 10 of both sexes were involved, a 
figure which seems remarkably high.
Figure 7 and Table A3 show how the situation has changed over the 1980s. There 
appears to have been a marked jump in the proportion of claimants affected in 1987-88 at 
durations of longer than 3 weeks, this despite the fall in the Department of Social Security’s 
work-load at this time due to declining unemployment. In fact, the figures for the early 
1980s in turn represent a significant increase from the 1970s. In 1972, only 3% of men in 
the 4-6 week range had an undetermined claim (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985, Table
’Information supplied by DSS. See also Department of Social Security (1989, p8).
10 Claims which are "doubtful" for reasons other than the contribution record are 
referred to Adjudification Officers for a decision. In 1988, 1.4 million out of a total of 4 
million claims to UI were referred with benefit eventually being allowed in 40% of cases 

















































































































































Fig 6a: UNDETERMINED CLAIM -  MEN 1988
% IN 3TOCK WITH Ul CLAIM NOT DETERMINED
1 0 0 -------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 0  -
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Fig 6b: UNDETERMINED CLAIM -  WOMEN 1988
% OF STOCK WITH Ul CLAIM NOT DETERMINED
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Fig 7a: UNDETERMINED CLAIM, MEN 1979 -88
*  OF STOCK W H  Ul CLAIM NOT DETERMINED
SO U R CE: S E E  APPEN D IX
□  4 - 6  W EEKS O 1 0 - 1 3  W E EK S
Fig 7b: UNDETERMINED CLAIM,WOMEN '7 9 -8 8
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4.2) despite contribution records not being computerised at this time. This compares with 
figures of 15% in 1979 (following computerisation), and 26% in 1987. On the evidence of 
these data from the unemployed stock, one may conclude that the ability of the DSS to 
promptly determine claims for UI appears to be in long-term decline, 
ii) Insufficient Contributions: not just the young
In 1988, 22% of all unemployed men claiming benefits, and 29% of women, were not 
receiving unemployment insurance because their contribution record was insufficient. To 
what extent does this situation reflect the rise of a "flexible" workforce (Hakim, 1989), in 
which part-time work and self-employment not resulting in UI cover have become more 
important?
Many of those with insufficient contribution records are young; about half of those 
affected of both sexes were aged less than 25 (nearer 60% for women). However, this 
leaves many in older age groups. For example, nearly a quarter of the men with a 
deficient contribution record were aged 30-44. It should be noted that these figures 
represent the effect of the o]d contribution conditions for UI. The new conditions, which 
came into operation in October 1988 for fresh claims, can be expected to result in a rise in 
the proportion of the unemployed with deficient contribution records and this may be one 
reason for the sharp fall in the coverage of UI in 1989 (see Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 8 provides some more information on the association of contribution deficiency 
with age, showing the incidence for men, married women and single women in the 
unemployed stock in 1988. The variation with age is markedly different for the three 
groups. For men, the frequency of insufficient contributions drops sharply from over 50% 
for teenagers to just over 20% at age 25-29, stabilising at around 17% for those aged 30-49 
before falling progressively for those aged 50 or over. Note that the proportion of
"prime-age" males with too poor a contribution record for UI is not insignificant. A 
substantial minority of men of an age that one might have expected to have been associated 
with good contribution records do not qualify for UI. (Under the rules operating in the 
period in question, past unemployment should not have damaged an individual’s contribution 
record since "crediting" of contributions takes place during registered unemployment.)
For single women, the change with age is similar up to the age of 35 to that for men 
(70% of all unemployed single women were beneath this age in 1988), although in each age 
range the figure for single-women is higher, something which is not easy to explain. 
However, from the age of 35 upwards the proportions of men and single women with a 
deficient contribution record are very different, the figure for the latter climbing sharply to 
over 40% for those in their 40s. Over these age ranges the pattern for single women 
resembles more closely that for married women, for whom the proportion affected rises 























































































































































Fig 8a: TOO FEW CONTRIBUTIONS, WEN 1988
% O F  STO CK  WrTX TGÜ FEW Ul C O N TF IH U TFS
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these figures make clear, the problem of a poor contribution record does not affect married 
female claimants so frequently as it does single women. We return to this phenomenon 
below.
For young people, the major barrier to receiving may be the first contribution 
condition, this requiring contributions to have been paid while in insurable employment; the 
second contribution condition (described earlier) is waived in the first year after leaving 
school. The effect of the first condition is to rule out receipt among those leaving full-time 
education and yet to find their first job.
Married women, on the other hand, may suffer from the second condition; periods 
spent out of the labour force do not attract National Insurance credits and a woman 
registering as unemployed after several years of inactivity will not qualify for UI. The 
same applies to a woman married before 1977 and still paying reduced rate contributions. 
She will not satisfy the conditions, even if she had been continuously in work prior to 
claiming UI.
It seems probable that the rise in contribution deficiency above age 30-34 for single 
women is associated with the number of divorced persons in this group, the definition of 
single women in the DSS data including those previously married.11 The substantial 
problem of insufficient contributions for UI for single women above the age of 35 may 
therefore represent, in part, the poor contribution records of women not previously working 
while married (or the choice to pay a reduced contribution rate during marriage).
However, there remains the question of why currently married women should have a 
lower incidence of insufficient contributions than a mixture of never and previously married 
women of the same age. Here the restriction of the DSS data to benefit claimants may be 
important. Due to the operation of the family means-test, women currently married are less 
likely to qualify for unemployment assistance (UA) than single or previously married 
women. Married women not qualified for UI therefore have less incentive to remain
registered as benefit claimants; those who do not will enter neither numerator nor 
denominator of calculations of incidence of contribution deficiency using DSS data. This is 
probably the main reason why - among claimants - there is such a low proportion of 
unemployed married women in their 20s who have a deficient contribution record and why 
the figures for married women are lower than those for single women.
What about those who are not young and who have not had long periods out of the 
labour force? Self-employment and part-time earnings beneath the threshold for National 
Insurance contributions do not qualify an individual for UI. As far as the latter is
11 In the population of Britain as a whole, there are more divorced and widowed 




























































































concerned, survey evidence suggests less than 2% of employed men in 1985-86 were in this 
position, earning at a level which would leave them uninsured (Hakim, 1989, Table 1). For 
women, for whom part-time work is more common, the figure was 12%. As far as self- 
employment is concerned, some 12% of the employed were working for themselves in 1987, 
a rise of around 5 per cent points since 1979 (Hakim, ibid., Table 4). If the decline in 
"regular” full-time employment has resulted in the present situation regarding UI cover, one 
would expect to find the proportion of the unemployed without a sufficient contribution 
record to have risen.12
This has certainly happened; the proportion of unemployed men and women with 
insufficient contributions for UI was 14% and 23% respectively in 1979, compared to the 
figures of 22% and 29% for 1988. Figure 9 shows how the position has changed for 
several different age-groups, Table A4 giving the details. For men and single women aged 
less than 25, there was a sharp rise in the proportion affected during the early 1980s, the 
figures then stabilising or, particularly for teenagers, falling back. The figures for older age 
groups have risen fairly steadily since 1982 (in the case of men, the proportion affected of 
all aged 30-49 has been very similar throughout 1979-88). For married women, there have 
only been slight rises in the proportion without sufficient contributions for UI, but the fact 
that there have been rises at all is notable, the proportion of employed married women 
paying reduced rate contributions, and thus not qualifying for UI in the event of 
unemployment, having fallen significantly.
It is tempting to conclude from Figure 9 that the growth of part-time work and 
self-employment during the 1980s has resulted in a lower UI coverage of the unemployed, 
falling unemployment since 1986 having led to a decline in contribution deficiency only for 
the young. While such an effect seems logical, some notice needs to be taken of the 
situation prior to 1979. For example, in 1974, some 12% of unemployed men aged 30-39 
were without UI because of their contribution records, the same figure as in 1979, while 
during 1975-77 over 15% were affected (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985, Table 4.3). 
This suggests that a more detailed analysis over a longer-time period is needed, preferably 
involving flow as well as stock data.13
12 Although it must be remembered that the data used in this paper refer to benefit 
claimants and if a rising proportion of those who are not qualified for UI have not claimed 
benefits, then the expected pattern would not be found.
13 One factor leading to a rise in the frequency of contribution deficiency has been 
the abolition of reduced rate UI for those with some contributions but not enough to qualify 
for the full rate of UI. However, the numbers involved were small (Atkinson and 
























































































































































Fig 9a: TOO FEW CONTRIBS. -  MEN '7 9 -8 8
%  O F  STOCK WITH TOO FEW Ul C O N T R IE U rN S
□  Aqm 2 0 -2 4  + A^m 2 5 -2 9  O Aq * 3 5 -3 9
FTg 9b: UNEMPLOYED MARRIED WOMEN '7 9 -8 8
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Fig 9c: UNEMPLOYED SINGLE WOMEN '7 9 -8 8
%  O F  STOCK WfTH TOO FEW Ul C O N T R IB U T hS
□  2 0 - 2 4  +  2 5 - 2 9  O  3 5 - 3 9
Pig 9d: UNEMPLOYED aged 16 -19, '7 9 -8 8
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The comparison with the the 1970s emphasises another aspect of the contribution 
system for UI in Britain. Despite a rise in male unemployment from less than 4% in 1974 
to around 14% in 1984, the proportion of men with insufficient contribution records rose by 
only a few per cent points for most age ranges. This is a tribute to the system of crediting 
contributions during unemployment, sustained periods of high unemployment not leading to 
a large-scale erosion of contribution records under the system prevailing up to October 
1988. The new system, where paid contributions are required in the tax-year prior to 
unemployment, marks a major change which will result in high unemployment leading to 
lower UI coverage.
iii) Exhaustion of UI: not just the long-term unemployed
UI cannot be paid for more than 52 weeks. This does not mean that all those 
unemployed for more than a year have exhausted entitlement, or that exhaustion cannot 
occur before a spell has lasted 52 weeks. On the one hand, some long-term unemployed 
may never have received UI. On the other, entitlement may be exhausted before a person 
has been unemployed a year, via the operation of the "linked-spells" rule described earlier.
In 1988, 30% of all unemployed women had been claiming benefits for over a year. 
Of these, exactly half had exhausted their UI entitlement. For men, an exhausted
entitlement applied to nearly three-quarters of the long-term unemployed (the long-term 
unemployed representing 40% of all claimants). A half of long-term unemployed women 
and a quarter of men had therefore never received UI.
Do those long-term unemployed that have exhausted their entitlement represent the 
majority of those persons running out of benefit? The answer is certainly "yes", but a 
substantial minority are people unemployed for less than a year. In 1988, "early" 
exhaustion of UI, via the operation of the linked spells rule, accounted for a quarter of all 
men with exhausted entitlement in the stock. Almost exactly the same figure applies to 
women (and there was virtually no difference between married and single women).
Figure 10 shows the changes over the 1980s in the importance of this group, early 
exhaustions being shown as a fraction of all exhaustions. The proportion exceeds a fifth for 
both sexes throughout the period. It appears inversely related to the level of unemployment, 
but it should be noted that the comparison of the period since 1982 with 1979-80 (when 
over 30% of exhaustion was concentrated at durations of less than a year) is affected by a 
change in the linked spells rule in September 1980, resulting in less frequent application in 
the later period.
Table A5 gives details for 1979-88 of the proportion of the unemployed at each 
duration who had exhausted their UI entitlement; this table shows the incidence of early 
exhaustion whereas Figure 10 was concerned with the concentration. Figure 11 illustrates 
































































































































Fig 10: U ±  EXHAUSTION, 1979 -88
*  EXHAUSTED WHO ARE UNEMPUDYED < 1 YEAR
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and over a quarter of those with durations 9-12 months. Exhaustion affects persons at 
much shorter durations as well; premature exhaustion affected at least 1 in 7 men in every 
duration of unemployment in 1988. Note that this does not imply that the rest received UI, 
there being reasons other than exhaustion for non-receipt. For example, in 1988, there were 
fewer than two unemployed men receiving UI at durations of 9-12 months for each man 
with exhausted entitlement.
The position for women is rather different, early exhaustion being much less common. 
Only in the 9-12 month range is the incidence of early exhaustion (among all unemployed 
women) as high as 10% and this is the result of the figures for single women.
The exhaustion of UI entitlement before a spell of unemployment has lasted a year 
seems to be a quite prominent feature of unemployment in Britain, at least as far as men 
are concerned.14
14 It is worth noting that if a person forgets to register availability for work by 
"signing-on", or fails to sign-on for some other similar reason, his or her UI claim is 
suspended but is not terminated (I am grateful to DSS Analytical Services Division for this 
information). A "linked-spell" would not be recorded in this situation and the prominence 
of "early" exhaustion should not therefore be artificially boosted by such a pattern of 
claims. Moreover, a substantial number of individuals can also be indentified in survey 
data (where it is the length of time since last job which is recorded) who appear to have 





























































































The unemployment insurance system in Britain offers a high probability of cover to 
the person with a history of stable, full-time employment who enters unemployment through 
no fault of their own. This is the type of person in the mind’s eye of many who comment 
adversely on the effect of UI on incentives to return to work. While it is widely known 
that UI cover lasts only for 12 months, few (if any) causes of non-receipt are well 
understood. That only a fifth of the unemployed in Britain who were claiming benefits at 
the end of 1989 were actually receiving UI is a fact that may come as somewhat of a 
suprise.
On the other hand, those who advise the unemployed on their rights, and others with 
detailed knowledge of the benefit system in Britain, will be familiar with the reasons which 
bring about this situation. Claims take time to be assessed (it seems an increasing time), a 
person’s contribution record may be insufficient, and previous spells of unemployment may 
result in early exhaustion of entitlement.
The new entrant to the labour force, the part-time worker on low earnings, the 
married woman recently returned to work or wanting to do so, the married woman who 
once opted for no UI cover, the entrepreneur whose enterprise has failed, the person who 
previously left unemployment for a temporary job, all these may well not receive UI. Some 
may get means-tested UA but, for the reasons outlined in the Introduction, this should not 
be viewed as an alternative of equal status. Both the operation of the labour market and 
the support of income during unemployment could be better served by UI.
The principal purpose of this paper has been to show that many unemployed people 
do not receive UI and to reveal the main reasons for the low coverage by UI of the 
claimant unemployed stock. In 1988, reasons other than exhaustion of entitlement acounted 
for nearly half of non-receipt among men and more than half among women. That these 
features of unemployment benefit are not more widely known is in part a reflection of the 
paucity of published information about the workings of the British UI system. One of the 
messages of this paper is that far more effort needs to be made by those responsible for UI 
in Britain to publish basic information concerning the system’s operation. It is only with 
such information that reasoned debate about the future of the benefit system for the 
unemployed can be conducted.
That future currently looks rather bleak. Those that would seek to argue for the 
phasing out of National Insurance unemployment benefit might point to the fact that in 
November 1989 little more than 1 in 10 of men and single women unemployed and 
claiming benefits were receiving UI payments which were not supplemented by means-tested 




























































































affect relatively few people. On the other hand, those who would argue for its retention 
might respond that, despite the factors leading to low coverage of the unemployed stock, it 
is the case that UI is paid at some time in about 50% of all spells in which benefits are 
claimed, a far from insignificant figure. As these examples show, a variety of measures of 
UI coverage can be used, relating to both stock and flow, and it is essential that these are 
available if the workings of the UI system are to be properly assessed. The analysis in this 
paper, based on unpublished data, has shown how holes in coverage come about. On the 
more positive view of UI, these holes are a problem to be resolved, not an excuse for 
abolition of UI. On this view, the arguments for the retention (and the strengthening) of UI 






























































































Reasons for non-receipt of NI benefit (al! durations of unemployment)
REASONS FOR NON-RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1979-88
Reason 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Title not yet 
determined
16.6 18.2 11.1 8.3 8.7 7.8 8.6 10.2 10.6
Insufficient
Contributions
22.9 25.9 25.9 30.7 32.6 32.4 32.3 29.9 28.6
Disqualification 2.0 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Exhaustion of 
Entitlement 56.6 51.8 59.2 58.2 55.7 56.6 55.5 55.5 55.7
Other 1.9 2.4 3.3 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.7 4.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
WOMEN
Reasons for non-receipt of NI benefit (all durations of unemployment)
Reason 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Title not yet 
determined
25.7 25.0 18.4 13.7 13.2 12.4 12.9 16.0 16.8
Insufficient
Contributions
42.6 46.4 46.6 50.4 49.9 48.3 47.3 44.2 43.1
Disqualifi­
cation
2.0 1.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.8
Exhaustion of 
Entitlement 26.4 23.1 30.5 31.1 31.7 33.4 33.5 31.8 30.6
Other 3.2 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.2 7.0 8.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0





























































































REASONS FOR NON-RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1979-88 
MARRIED WOMEN
Reasons for non-receipt of NI benefit (all durations of unemployment)
Reason 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Title not yet 
determined
33.0 31.0 21.2 17.5 14.4 15.2 15.0 18.8 20.8
Insufficient
Contributions
29.4 30.2 25.6 26.4 26.0 26.6 27.7 27.7 29.1
Disqualifi­
cation
2.6 2.3 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.1
Exhaustion of 
Entitlement
30.1 29.1 46.6 49.8 53.3 51.3 49.7 44.4 39.4
Other 4.9 7.4 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.7 6.0 8.0 9.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SINGLE WOMEN
Reasons for non-receipt of NI benefit (all durations of unemployment)
Reason 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Title not yet 
determined
23.4 23.0 17.5 12.6 12.8 11.3 11.9 14.7 14.9
Insufficient
Contributions
46.9 51.8 53.3 58.0 58.1 57.3 56.1 51.7 49.4
Disqualifi­
cation
1.9 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6
Exhaustion of 
Entitlement
25.3 21.0 25.3 25.3 24.2 26.0 26.2 26.2 26.7
Other 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.6 4.1 4.5 4.9 6.5 8.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0





























































































UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ENTITLEMENT NOT YET DETERMINED
MEN
Percentage with title to NI benefit not yet determined by duration of incomplete spell
DURATION 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1 WEEK 76.2 77.0 71.5 68.8 66.1 73.8 77.7 74.9 73.5
2-3 WEEKS 42.7 37.6 40.3 36.2 36.5 37.8 39.6 42.3 41.6
4-6 " 15.1 14.0 18.1 16.1 18.6 18.1 17.6 25.6 22.6
7-9 " 5.9 6.5 9.8 7.3 0.2 9.0 9.1 14.7 15.2
10-13" 4.3 4.2 6.2 4 1 5.6 4.2 4.6 0.0 11.5
14-26 " 2.5 2.5 4.0 2.3 3.7 2.2 2.2 2.1 4.8
27-39 " 1.7 1.6 2.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4
40-52 " 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
All Durations 10.1 9.6 7.3 5.8 6.4 5.7 6.2 7.6 8.0
WOMEN
Percentage with tide to NI benefit not yet determined by duration o f incomplete spell
DURATION 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1 WEEK 83.5 85.7 82.0 81.1 74.0 82.6 85.1 84.3 84.1
2-3 WEEKS 50.5 44.8 47.3 44.3 41.4 44.3 46.5 50.8 51.2
4-6 " 18.7 17.5 20.1 18.3 20.0 20.2 18.7 29.8 28.5
7-9 " 8.6 8.3 11.2 8.7 9.9 9.8 9.7 17.3 19.1
10-13 " 5.2 6.1 6.9 4.0 5.7 4.4 5.1 10.3 12.3
14-26 " 3.1 3.5 5.0 2.7 3.4 2.3 2.1 2.3 4.2
27-39 " 2.0 2.1 3.5 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2
40-52 " 2.1 1.8 2.8 1.3 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8
> 5 2  ” 2.2 1.5 1.9 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6
All Durations 14.1 12.7 11.0 8.6 8.4 8.0 8.2 10.6 11.1





























































































I N S U F F I C I E N T  C O N T R I B U T I O N S  F O R  U N E M P L O Y M E N T  
I N S U R A N C E  1 9 79-88
MEN
Percentage with insufficient contributions for NI benefit by age
AGE 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
16-19 37.9 38.7 52.4 62.7 64.1 61.7 60.6 54.4 52.6
20-24 14.2 12.7 16.5 21.7 28.3 30.3 30.8 30.5 29.8
25-29 11.7 10.1 11.6 13.6 15.4 16.2 17.2 18.6 20.7
30-34 12.3 10.6 12.7 13.8 14.9 15.5 16.2 16.6 17.0
35-39 12.8 10.7 12.7 14.1 15.3 16.7 17.3 17.5 17.7
40-44 12.5 10.3 12.2 14.5 16.2 17.1 17.5 17.7 17.8
45-49 12.1 10.1 11.6 13.1 14.3 16.2 17.1 17.4 17.3
50-54 11.5 9.4 9.7 10.2 11.6 11.7 11.3 11.7 11.6
55-59 9.3 7.9 6.3 7.1 8.3 8.7 8.5 8.7 9.1
60+ 4.8 4.7 3.4 3.8 3.4 4.1 3.4 2.7 3.6
All ages 14.1 13.7 17.0 21.3 23.8 23.7 23.4 22.3 21.6
WOMEN
Percentage with insufficient contributions for NI benefit by age
AGE 1979 1980 1982 1983
16-19 41.9 43.5 55.9 64.5
20-24 12.6 12.3 17.5 22.4
25-29 8.4 8.1 8.5 9.9
30-34 12.2 13.4 11.1 11.5
35-39 22.3 17.6 17.1 18.8
40-44 30.1 23.9 23.2 25.8
45-49 30.4 27.2 26.8 29.2
50-54 28.1 26.4 23.2 22.3
55-59 20.5 18.8 16.2 16.5
60+ 26.7 29.2 17.5 17.3
All ages 23.4 23.5 27.7 31.4
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
65.5 64.1 62.4 57.3 54.2
26.6 28.7 28.1 28.1 28.4
10.1 10.9 11.2 13.5 14.7
11.8 13.0 13.4 13.9 14.9
20.8 22.2 22.9 24.3 24.7
27.8 29.5 31.6 32.8 35.9
32.5 34.0 35.1 36.7 37.0
22.4 23.6 24.4 24.1 25.7
17.2 17.1 17.2 17.1 17.7
15.1 26.3 14.4 17.2 20.9






























































































Percentage with insufficient contributions for NI benefit by age
AGE 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
16-19 3.2 4.7 8.8 14.7 15.3 21.0 19.1 18.6 18.5
20-24 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.8 4.6 6.0 6.5 6.5 7.5
25-29 4.1 4.8 4.8 5.4 5.0 5.5 5.6 6.1 5.9
30-34 9.4 10.9 9.3 8.9 9.7 10.4 10.4 10.8 11.2
35-39 19.8 15.2 13.5 13.8 15.5 17.2 18.4 18.5 18.5
40-44 26.3 22.4 18.8 19.1 21.2 23.0 25.0 26.1 28.5
45-49 29.6 24.6 20.8 22.7 23.9 6.0 27.4 27.9 28.5
50-54 26.4 21.9 19.0 18.5 17.8 19.7 21.1 21.1 22.2
55-59 18.6 15.2 13.9 14.5 16.2 15.7 16.8 16.3 16.3
60+ 16.9 19.1 17.4 20.9 8.6 4.1 9.3 17.2 24.5
All ages 10.1 9.7 9.7 10.5 10.9 12.1 12.9 13.7 14.5
SINGLE WOMEN
Percentage with insufficient contributions for NI benefit by age
AGE 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
16-19 45.9 46.8 58.1 66.1 67.1 65.4 63.9 58.6 55.4
20-24 19.8 19.4 25.6 31.5 37.3 39.6 38.0 36.7 35.9
25-29 16.9 15.1 15.8 18.8 20.6 22.6 22.9 25.8 27.1
30-34 17.3 18.6 15.0 17.6 16.9 19.9 21.5 21.1 22.6
35-39 25.4 21.9 23.4 27.2 29.5 31.3 31.3 33.8 33.4
40-44 33.9 25.7 28.9 34.3 36.8 38.0 39.8 40.2 43.1
45-49 31.1 29.8 33.3 36.2 41.1 41.9 42.6 45.1 44.8
50-54 29.1 30.0 27.2 26.0 27.3 27.8 27.9 27.3 29.4
55-59 21.4 21.0 17.9 18.1 18.0 18.4 17.6 17.8 19.0
60+ 34.5 34.6 17.7 15.2 18.8 35.1 17.6 17.1 18.1
All ages 31.9 32.7 38.8 44.0 45.2 44.4 42.9 40.3 38.2





























































































EXHAUSTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1979-88
MEN
Percentage with NI benefit exhausted by duration of incomplete spell
DURATION 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1 WEEK 6.6 6.7 11.2 12.6 12.0 11.9 12.8 14.7 17.5
2-3 WEEKS 7.8 6.6 10.5 11.8 11.2 11.3 10.9 12.0 15.1
4-6 " 8.8 6.5 10.9 11.8 11.0 11.4 10.5 12.9 14.8
7-9 " 12.1 6.8 11.6 13.5 11.5 12.2 11.7 13.8 14.7
10-13 " 12.2 8.4 12.6 13.0 11.2 12.7 12.0 14.4 15.5
14-26 " 16.3 11.3 16.1 15.7 15.8 14.8 14.6 16.5 19.3
27-39 ” 23.3 17.3 20.1 18.5 18.7 17.2 17.0 18.4 22.0
40-52 ” 27.3 26.6 21.7 22.4 22.3 22.6 19.9 21.4 25.6
>52 " 83.5 83.0 81.0 77.6 74.2 74.4 74.2 73.6 73.3
All Durations 34.6 27.2 38.9 40.4 40.6 41.5 40.2 41.4 42.1
WOMEN
Percentage with NI benefit exhausted by duration of incomplete spell
DURATION 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1 WEEK 2.5 2.8 5.4 6.2 6.5 7.0 7.5 6.5 7.8
2-3 WEEKS 3.8 3.4 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.2 5.5 6.4
4-6 " 3.9 2.6 5.6 4.9 4.8 5.5 5.4 6.1 6.5
7-9 5.3 2.2 5.5 5.9 4.8 5.2 5.9 5.7 7.1
10-13 " 5.2 4.2 4.8 5.2 4.1 5.2 5.4 6.7 6.8
14-26 " 7.2 4.5 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.4 6.8 7.5 7.4
27-39 " 9.6 6.8 9.1 7.6 8.1 7.2 7.6 7.7 8.5
40-52 ” 13.7 11.5 11.2 11.0 10.5 10.1 10.5 9.8 10.5
>52 " 59.3 59.8 58.6 55.5 53.1 54.7 54.2 51.7 49.6
All Durations 14.4 11.7 18.1 19.4 20.2 21.5 21.4 21.1 20.2





























































































The data used in this paper are drawn from unpublished tabulations produced 
internally within the Department of Social Security. These tabulations are based on two 
regular analyses of the benefit position of the stock of unemployed claiming benefits. The 
first of these, known as the UBS2 return, is conducted quarterly (in February, May, August 
and November) and is based on all claimants. Data from this source form the basis for 
figures given in the text of the Introduction and for Figures 1 and 2, the figures for each 
year being calculated using the quarterly data (it should be noted that proportion receiving 
benefit in each year in Figure 1 has been calculated as the average number of recipients 
divided by the average number of unemployed, and not as the average of quarterly 
proportions). Data are missing for the following counts: February 1974, November 1976, 
May, August, November 1981, May, August, November 1984, February, May, August, 1985.
The second regular source of data is the count, known as the UBS3 return, conducted 
twice-yearly (in February and November) of 5% of unemployed benefit claimants. DSS 
tabulations based on these data are the principal source drawn on in this paper and were 
used to construct Figures 3 and 5-11 and Tables A1-A5. It is this source which contains 
information on the reasons for non-receipt of HI. Again, no count was held at each of the 
dates listed above, with the exception of November 1984 and May 1985. This means that 
no information on the reason for non-reciept is available for 1981. In all the Figures and 
Tables drawing on these 5% counts, the data for the two counts per year have been 
combined to produce annual figures, except in the case in 1984 when only the November 
data are available.
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